Federal Reserve Economic Data

In a previous FRED blog, we discussed the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) released by the FOMC this past March. In this blog post, we will again use ALFRED, the vintage data version of FRED, to compare the latest projections released in June 2025 with several of the recent projections through 2027 for the following variables:

• the unemployment rate
• core PCEPI inflation
• real GDP growth
• the federal funds rate

It’s important to note that these projections represent neither a committee plan nor a decision on future policy.

The first ALFRED graph, above, shows the unemployment rate projections for the fourth quarters of 2025, 2026, and 2027. Most recent values are shown by the gold bar. The median FOMC participant projects that the unemployment rate will average 4.5% in Q4 2025, and drop to 4.4% by 2027. This is just above the projection provided in March, and only slightly higher than the longer-run unemployment rate projection of 4.2%.

The second graph shows the core inflation rate projections for the same years. The median FOMC participant now projects 3.1% inflation over 2025, and just-over-trend inflation of 2.1% by 2027.

The third graph, above, shows the median projections for real GDP growth. Growth projections for 2025 have been revised downward since December 2024, from 2.1% to 1.4%. However, the projections for growth over 2027 remain unchanged from the projections released in March, at 1.8%.

Our final graph shows the median participant’s projections of the federal funds rate. The most recent projections are unchanged from their March 2025 values for 2025, but are slightly higher than the March projections for 2026 and 2027. It is worth noting, though, that focusing on the median federal funds rate projection does obscure some of the dispersion of the individual participant projections. For example, projections for the year-end policy rate range from 3.6% to 4.4% (almost a full percentage point spread).

How these graphs were created: Search ALFRED for “FOMC unemployment” and take the median projection. Click on “Edit Graph,” choose a bar graph, and add three bars with the same series again. Finally, select the proper vintage for each bar. For the other three graphs, proceed similarly with “FOMC Consumption,” “FOMC Growth,” and “FOMC Fed Funds Rate.”

Suggested by Joseph Martorana and Charles Gascon.

Uncertainty surrounding trade policy can significantly affect International trade flows. Our first FRED graph, above, displays an index of trade policy uncertainty and the percent change in imports. The spike in uncertainty starting in late 2024 coincides with the spike in imports, suggesting that US importers preemptively accelerated their purchases as a precaution against anticipated tariff hikes or other trade disruptions.

To dig a little deeper, we look to our second graph, which separates total US imports by their region of origin. US imports from most regions grew modestly, but imports from Europe (the red-orange dash-dot line) distinctly stand out: They expanded rapidly and significantly surpassed the growth of all other sources of US imports. What accounts for this European import surge?

Our third graph separates European imports to the US by individual country. Switzerland (the red dashed line) clearly emerges as the dominant contributor, significantly outpacing all other European nations. This surge in Swiss imports is predominantly driven by increased purchases of gold, shown by the solid red line. This targeted increase in gold imports likely reflects precautionary behavior by businesses and investors seeking a safe-haven asset amid heightened trade policy uncertainty. Of course, other factors such as portfolio diversification could also play a role.

The key takeaway here is that responses to trade policy uncertainty can vary significantly across sectors and trading partners. The recent increase in US imports amid rising trade policy uncertainty isn’t an across-the-board phenomenon, but seems largely driven by precautionary imports of gold from Switzerland.

How these graphs were created: First graph: Search FRED for and select “Imports of Goods: Balance of Payments Basis.” Click on “Edit Graph,” change the units to “Percent Change from Year Ago.” From the “Add Line” tab, search for “Economic Policy Uncertainty Index: Categorical Index: Trade policy,” click “Add data series,” and change the units to “Index”; in the “Format” tab, click “Customize” and change “Y-Axis position” to “Right.” Set the first date as 2024-04-01. Second graph: Search FRED for and select “U.S. Imports of Goods by Customs Basis” for China, World, Canada, Europe, and Asia. From “Edit Graph” panel, edit the line for Canada by using the “Customize data” field to search for and add “U.S. Imports of Goods by Customs Basis for Mexico.” Type the formula a+b and click “Apply.” Next, change the units to “Percent Change from Year Ago” and click on “Copy to all.” Set the first date as 2024-03-01. Third graph: Search FRED for and select “U.S. Imports of Goods by Customs Basis” for Germany, Europe, France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland and then also “Imports of Goods: Nonmonetary gold.” Change the units to “Percent Change from Year Ago” and again click on “Copy to all” and use 2024-03-01.

Suggested by Fernando Leibovici.

The FRED Blog has discussed the economic impact of war on labor markets and energy prices. Today, we discuss the impact on the price of lard. Stay with us, here…

Our FRED graph above shows data from the NBER’s Macrohistory Database on the retail and wholesale prices of lard in New York between 1911 and 1943. There were very large price swings during that time, so let’s break it down:

• Between 1911 and early 1916, lard prices were stable in the range of $0.10 – $0.15 per pound, even though World War I began in 1914 and the US didn’t enter the conflict until almost three years later.
• Between mid-1916 and mid-1919, retail lard prices (solid dark blue line) rose by 156% and wholesale prices (dashed light blue line) rose by 168%. Increased foreign demand for food items, whose production was disrupted during the Great War, helps explain those price hikes.
• After 1920, prices dropped below pre-war levels once foreign supply expanded, vegetable-based consumer alternatives to lard became available, and the Great Depression began.

World War II broke out in 1939 and the U.S. joined the conflict at the end of 1941. But the price of lard  and many other agricultural products didn’t rise nearly as much as they did two decades earlier. Changes  in consumption patterns and international finance conditions and the experience gained during World War I in managing agricultural prices all contributed to this more muted inflationary response.

At the risk of larding this post, it’s thought-provoking to discuss the ratio between the retail and wholesale prices during this time. The retail price is always higher than the wholesale price, to account for retailer overhead cost (e.g., distribution and marketing expenses) and profit margins. But the price margin between retail and wholesale prices was at its lowest between 1916 and 1919, when prices were rising the fastest. This may reflect some difficulty in passing on the full amount of the price increases to consumers.

Read more about farm product prices during the world wars in this related article by J.M. Tinley in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. For a deeper dive into the history of lard and a gruesome reference to Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, check this episode of the Planet Money podcast.

How this graph was created: Search FRED for and select “Retail Price of Lard for New York, NY.” From the “Edit Graph” panel, use the “Add Line” tab to search for and select “Wholesale Price of Lard for New York, NY.”

Suggested by Diego Mendez-Carbajo.