The FRED® Blog

Paychecks at the top, at the bottom, and in the middle

A look at the distribution of wage income

Let’s consider the topic of income disparity by looking at some data from our friends at the Bureau of Labor Statistics—or, as we like to call them, the BLS. (Just to clarify: Top incomes are increasing more than others not so much because of regular labor income, but largely because of capital income, various bonuses, and the like. That said, in this post we’ll stick with the distribution of regular wage income.)

The BLS’s Current Population Survey provides weekly wage income data for the U.S. population that can be split into various segments: These segments are ordered by income, from the very top (100%) to the very bottom (1%). The segments we chose, from top to bottom in the graph, are the 90%, 75%, 25%, and 10% levels. (That is, the ninth decile, the third quartile, the first quartile, and the first decile.) The reported income for each of these segments is divided by the median income to show how each segment compares with the wage earner in the middle of the entire distribution.

So, what do we learn from this graph? For one thing, in 2018, the wage earner at the 90% level got 2.4 times what the median wage earner got. The wage earner at the 10% level got half of what the median wage earner got. It appears that the two bottom segments (25% and 10%) are rather stable compared with the median, except for a surprising improvement recently for the 10% level. The 75% level is almost completely flat. The 90% level is showing a gradual increase, about 10% over the 18 years for which we have data. Although wage income disparity isn’t as spectacular as total income disparity, it is increasing.

How this graph was created: From the release table with the wage quantiles, select the series you want and click “Add to Graph.” If necessary, restrict the sample period to include all series. From the “Edit Graph” panel, add to each line the median statistic (series ID LEU0252887700A), applying formula a/b. From the “Format” tab, move the lines so that the order of the legends matches the order of the lines in the graph. Finally, de-select the “Show: Title” option, as the legends take waaaaaay too much space. (The legends are mostly still visible when you hover over the lines, though.)

Suggested by Christian Zimmermann.

View on FRED, series used in this post: LEU0252887700A, LEU0252916000A, LEU0252916100A, LEU0252916200A, LEU0252916300A

The give and take of technology

Changes in U.S. imports and exports of intellectual property

The U.S. creates many technological innovations that the rest of the world wants to use. The FRED graph above tracks how much technology the U.S. exported to the rest of the world from 2002 to 2018 (blue line), as measured by payments the world made for the use of U.S. intellectual property (IP). These payments, in the form of royalties and licensing fees, increased from $67 billion to about $118 billion, showing that the U.S. has substantially increased the knowledge it shares globally.

The U.S. also seeks out technology it doesn’t produce at home. So our graph also displays what the U.S. imported from the rest of the world (red line), as measured by the royalty payments the U.S. made to all other countries for the use of their IP. Take care to connect the exports with the left axis and the imports with the right axis, and you can see that the U.S. transfers much more knowledge than it receives from the rest of the world. But the graph also reveals some finer points.

  1. During the Great Recession of 2008-09, real U.S. exports of IP decreased slightly but real U.S. imports of IP kept increasing. In fact, the U.S. has been on a largely continuous trajectory of technology imports, even during periods when its technology exports have declined.
  2. The U.S. has imported IP from the rest of the world at a faster pace than it has exported it. During 2002-2018, real royalties from U.S. technology exports increased by 75%, but real royalties from U.S. technology imports increased by 113%. The last four years of the sample are largely responsible for this faster pace: Since 2015, royalties from U.S. technology imports have grown by 30%, considerably faster than the -2.5% rate for exports.

So, is foreign technology increasing its contribution to U.S. innovation?

Data from the OECD provide some highlights: The main contributors of technology transfer to the U.S. are the European Union and Japan, accounting for 45% and 21% of payments, respectively, in 2017. Although a much smaller contributor, China has increased its technology transfer to the U.S. In 2002, China’s share of U.S. royalties for foreign IP was 0.1%; by 2017, its share had increased to almost 2%—which could be an indication China will become one of the leaders in global innovation and knowledge sharing.

How this graph was created: Search for and select the annual series “Real exports of services: Royalties and license fees”; from the “Edit Graph” panel, use the “Add Line” option to search for and select the annual series “Real imports of services: Royalties and license fees.” In the “Format” tab, for Line 2, click “Right” under the “Y-Axis position” label to shift its y-axis to the right side of the graph.

Suggested by Makenzie Peake and Ana Maria Santacreu.

View on FRED, series used in this post: B684RX1Q020SBEA, B908RX1Q020SBEA

Capital’s gain is lately labour’s loss

The global decline in the labour share of income

The GDP of a country reflects, among other things, the total payments to all factors of production. For a long time, the share of payments to labour* relative to total payments to all factors of production was relatively stable. In recent decades, the share of payments to labour has been trending down in many countries, which FRED can help us illustrate.

The first graph shows that the share of labour compensation in GDP has been declining for several countries around the world. In the U.S., this share has declined by 5% between 1975 and 2017. The decline in other countries is even greater, with the largest occurring in Canada, at almost 11%.

Researchers Karabarbounis and Neiman recently argued that there’s an association between the declining labour share and the declining price of capital goods, such as equipment. They show that, if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is larger than one (that is, if it’s easy to switch from labour to capital), then a decline in the price of capital will increase the use of capital in production—thus, increasing capital’s income share. This move away from labour has led to the decline of its global share of income. The authors estimate that the declining price of investment goods can explain nearly half of the decline in global labour share.

And, right on cue, the graph below shows this decline in the price of investment goods relative to the price of consumption in the U.S. Between 1947 and 2016, the relative price of investment goods fell by almost 78%. This decline in relative prices could be the result of several factors, such as a reduction of trade barriers that facilitated the exchange of capital goods across borders and technological improvements that led to greater efficiency in the production of those capital goods.

How these graphs were created: For the first graph, search for and select the series “Share of Labour Compensation in GDP at Current National Prices for United States” and click “Add to Graph.” Then, in the “Edit Graph” menu, under the “Add Line” tab, search for and select the series “Share of Labour Compensation in GDP at Current National Prices for Germany” (and then do the same for Canada, Japan, and France) and click “Add data series.” For the second graph, just search for and select “Relative Price of Investment Goods” and click “Add to Graph.”

* In deference to the University of Groningen, one of the sources of the data, we use their preferred, British spelling of labour.

Suggested by Asha Bharadwaj and Maximiliano Dvorkin.

View on FRED, series used in this post: LABSHPCAA156NRUG, LABSHPDEA156NRUG, LABSHPFRA156NRUG, LABSHPJPA156NRUG, LABSHPUSA156NRUG, PIRIC


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